By Matti Häyry

24th February 2025

 

My Argument

Antinatalism means being against reproduction on ethical grounds – in typical cases, not having children and believing that the decision not to have children is morally right. Other definitions, some of them extending their scope to other species, have been offered but this characterization is sufficient for my purposes here.[1]

I argue that anarchists should be antinatalists insofar as:

i) anarchism means being against nonconsensual hierarchies

and

ii) reproduction creates and perpetuates nonconsensual hierarchies.

Anarchists should probably be antinatalists on other grounds, too, but my main justification is built on (i) and (ii).

 

An Anarchist Antinatalist Makes the Case

I am not the first to argue the case. Already in 2002, Les U. Knight, the founder of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (VHEMT) defended the connection in a pamphlet titled “Why Real Anarchists Don’t Breed”.[2] His reasons were manifold and need to be critically examined but this is what he wrote:

Anarchy includes taking responsibility for our own lives. Creating a dependent which “takes a village” to raise, forces others to share responsibility for a couple’s free choice. Breeding, especially insisting on extra services for breeding, shirks personal responsibility.

Anarchists eschew hierarchy, favoring interactions among equals. Parent-child relationships are hierarchical, not consensual. Children don’t choose to be born, but parents do choose to breed. Creating a dependent child also creates an authority figure for many years […]

Anarchists and environmentalists understand the biosphere is in danger, and that six billion of us is far too many. Taking personal responsibility, we eschew breeding for the sake of both humankind and the Earth. Earth’s biosphere will benefit as every demand humans place on Nature is reduced. Human society will benefit from an improved birth rate, as shortages of food, housing, and resources are potentially lessened. Existing children could be better cared for in the coming weird times if there are fewer of them. By not breeding, we’ll have more time and energy for promoting social change.

Anarchists seek neither security nor stability, understanding these states of illusion are not compatible with real social change. Parents seek both security and stability, for the sake of their children. Good parents make bad anarchists.

Knight’s exposition provides four distinct reasons for anarchists not to have offspring:

a) Reproducers burden others with duties that others have not chosen, failing to take responsibility of their own choices.

b) Reproducers create, before and after the birth of a child, nonconsensual hierarchies that last long into its life.

c) Reproducers overcrowd the planet and perpetuate social arrangements that harm people and the biosphere.

d) Reproducers promote illusions of security and stability that stand in the way of beneficial social and political change.

I am not personally opposed to any of these – but I believe that some of them are prone to raise criticisms that confuse the case. Therefore, before explicating point (b), my own choice, let me add a few caveats to the other three.

 

Reproducers burden others with duties that should be their own?

When people have children, they usually assume that, as Knight says, there is a “village” available to bring them up (point a). In the Global North, public subsidies and services are available for daycare, health services, and education. These are funded through taxes collected from nonparents and parents alike.

I questioned the arrangement in a 2009 book chapter titled “Is Transferred Parental Responsibility Legitimately Enforceable?” by asking:

Parents have a special responsibility for the wellbeing of their children. If a young child accidentally hurts itself in the company of several adults, including its parents, it is understood that it is primarily the parents’ responsibility to comfort the child. If the parents are absent, others may have obligations towards the child. But in their presence even the entitlement, let alone a duty, to interfere can be questioned. (Are you suggesting that I cannot take care of my own child?) Parental responsibility is closely intertwined with parental autonomy and authority.

Despite the recognised fact that parents have a special responsibility for their children, the state forces me, through taxation, to cater for the wellbeing of other people’s children even when the parents are perfectly capable of doing it themselves. Money that I could use to buy goods and services of my choice is taken away from me and spent on healthcare services and educational packages for children whose parents could have afforded to pay for these. Why is this? Why am I, an individual who has no children and does not intend to have any, made to provide for other people’s children when these other people are around to do it themselves?[3]

I then went on to present a possible answer to the question:

A standard response to this is that parents and the state have an arrangement. The state needs new citizens for its continued existence and parents are the ones who can satisfy this need. Parents, in their turn, need protection for themselves and for their families, and the state is the institution that can guarantee the required security. Consequently, an unwritten deal exists between the two parties. Parents produce new citizens for the state in exchange for protection; and the state refrains from interfering with family life as long as parents continue to deliver good, contributing members to the civil society and the state.[4]

This response does not explain why the childless person should bear any part of the burden – and I proceed to show this in detail – but it is what people, presumably even those who think of themselves as anarchists, have in mind. It would not be a straightforward task to convince a community-oriented activist that mutual care could be seen as an imposition. Coercive government may be the wrong instrument, but the care needs to be delivered in one way or another and everyone should chip in. Our burdens and responsibilities are shared and attempts to pry away from them could be seen as an indication of deplorable egoism rather than solidarity befitting an anarchist.

 

Reproducers overcrowd the planet and perpetuate harmful social arrangements?

Six billion people, Knight’s figure in 2002, let alone the current eight billion, may well be too many (point c), but, depending on the goal of our action, full-blown antinatalism may not be the answer. By full-blown antinatalism I mean a complete universal cessation of at least human reproduction that will inevitably lead to the demise of the species. The queer-death philosopher Patricia MacCormack hails developments into this direction in her 2020 book The Ahuman Manifesto:

Put very simply, human extinction can be understood as a good idea for ecosophical ethics and need not be considered “unthinkable” but can be welcomed as affirmative of earth life.[5]

MacCormack’s aspiration is to liberate the planet from its most detrimental species, homo sapiens, to leave space for other forms of life. Others focus on the human condition and envision the end of its suffering, but the conclusion is the same. As formulated by the paragon antinatalist philosopher David Benatar in his seminal 2006 book Better Never to Have Been:

My [anti-natal] arguments […] imply that it would be better if humans (and other species) became extinct. All things being equal, my arguments also suggest that it would be better if this occurred sooner rather than later. These conclusions are deeply unsettling to many people.[6]

Knight is not among those who would be unsettled by human extinction – he established a movement to hasten it – but quite a few anarchists are. In fact, his quoted pamphlet is a response to such anarchists. His attempt to reserve a table at an anarchist bookfair had reportedly received this reply:[7]

We are totally opposed to the VHEM [Knight’s organization], and do not want your movement/group at our bookfair. You can attend as an individual, but any sort of VHEM literature or propaganda will be met with hostility.

It seems clear that Knight’s advocacy of antinatalism in general and extinctionism in particular have influenced this decision.

Anarchists do not promote overpopulation, capitalism, or the degradation of the natural environment. Their goal, however, is seldom the elimination of species, human or otherwise. On the contrary, they are motivated by the survival of our race, and of other forms of life. The amount of people and the political and economic systems should be adjusted to be sustainable, that is, to be capable of functioning over generations.[8] A call for humans to vanish, however, especially so that (in Knight’s words) “society will benefit […] and […] children could be better cared for” has a contradictory air to it. Eventually, if the antinatalist route is taken, what society, which children?

 

Reproducers seek security and stability and promote the status quo?

As described in my “unwritten deal” above, parents seek the state’s protection for their family lives. And as observed by Knight, this may lead to them upholding existing institutions (point d). Before the four reasons, his preamble included:[9]

Capitalism is dependent on a growing population and an expendable work force […] Society’s institutions are dependent on our producing families. Churches, schools, and social services, all need fresh supplies of human bodies to exist.

Business applauds births. As if to celebrate each new North American life, a multi-passenger vehicle rolls off the assembly line to join it.

Knight’s suggestion may, however, be overstated. He seems to claim that capitalism and churches with their hegemonies have no alternatives. Produce children and the market forces and religious indoctrination will swallow them, whatever you try to do.

It is understandable that some anarchists disagree with this diagnosis. The ideology exists exactly to challenge these coercive and manipulative institutions and to provide a better future for coming generations. In terms of my own – stated at the outset – argument anarchists can (i) be opposed to nonconsensual hierarchies yet (ii) believe that their having children will not perpetuate such hierarchies in economic and religious arrangements. If power structures can be revolutionized by anarchist activities, the security and stability required by parents can be pursued through fearless change as well as through timid obedience.

This type of sentiment has been captured well by Julian Langer in a 2021 online text called “Liberation Natalism”:

The anarchist natalist has come to appreciate the praxis of parenthood, as they know that there is no one right way to live, for any of us, but are choosing parenthood for themselves. My experience of talking about their being-parents with radical-dads and anarcho-mummies is entirely of their feeling that there is no right way to live, to parent and so on, but that it is what they want to do and that they wouldn’t do anything else. These parents also have a desire to encourage their children to deconstruct authoritarianism, to live a life that rebels against the system and to be beautifully creative (in their destructive passions) – while also appreciating that the children they guide have their own adventures to explore, inclinations, minds and desires. This is what liberation natalism seeks to bring – the opportunity for a generation raised with the energy of rebellion, liberation and primal anarchy. Not to oblige or force anyone into parenthood, but to embrace the desires of individuals to parent, and parent as they wish.[10]

I will return forthwith to the feasibility of deconstructing authoritarianism by having children but the message is clear. There are anarchists who are natalists yet do not want to maintain all current ways of living.

 

Reproducers create and perpetuate nonconsensual hierarchies!

Anarchist natalists – or liberation natalists as Langer calls them – can, no doubt, show how the education they provide for their children is conducive to rebellion, liberation, and primal anarchy. At first glance, this would seem to fend off Knight’s claim that parenting necessarily promotes hegemonic thinking patterns (point b). A closer look shows, however, that the situation is more complicated. Langer’s “radical-dads and anarcho-mummies” create, in fact, nonconsensual hierarchies as inexorably as their conservatively compliant peers.

As Knight points out, children do not choose to be born – their parents make that choice for them. No consent, no consensus, just a hegemonic decision. And, as he continues, the nonconsensual hierarchy remains in place at least throughout the child’s infancy and childhood, probably also through its adolescence and young adulthood – although rebellion may set in at the later stages. That it can, and with anarchist upbringing will, set in at some point is what the liberation-natalist parents count on.

But here comes the twist in the tale. What kind of rebellion? Individuals brought up by conservative parents have a genuine chance of turning against them and to gain anarchist independence. Individuals brought up by radical parents, however, do not have that luxury. They can rebel and become conservatives or follow their parents and become radicals. In the latter case, apart from minor technical disagreements – direct or indirect action, sustainable growth or degrowth, and the like – the children will not get rid of their parents’ worldview at all. Anarchist children of anarchist parents are doomed to replicate their progenitors’ basic attitudes.

One basic attitude that heirs of liberation natalists can inherit is natalism. In our 2024 book Antinatalism, Extinction, and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption, Amanda Sukenick and I claim that this is well-nigh inescapable regardless of politics. Starting from the concept of a child’s right to an open future,[11] [12] [13] [14] we argue that while the right is widely recognized – and in the current context eminently acceptable to liberation natalists – it is routinely violated by parents who wish only the best for their children:

By their actions, parents should not foreclose any reasonable and benign life decisions that their children grow up to make […]

By imposing a pronatalist mentality and lifestyle on their progeny, parents violate their children’s right to an open future. In most cases, they do not explicitly force them to reproduce but they can and often do make the alternative highly unattractive.

The parental motivation to raise children in the spirit of pronatalism is understandable in many ways. Reproducers are proud to have offspring and want to see the cycle repeated in the next generation. The alternative […] is not that tempting, either. Telling your children that having children is wrong comes close to saying that you regret their existence, that they are unwanted.[15]

Langer’s protestations notwithstanding, then, anarchists who procreate can be unlikely to encourage their children to act differently. Amanda Sukenick and I call this phenomenon procreative self-corruption, the Argentinian-Brazilian antinatalist philosopher Julio Cabrera manipulation,[16] Benatar indoctrination,[17] and the Finnish philosopher Heta Häyry unwarranted paternalism,[18] but the essence is the creation and perpetuation of nonconsensual hierarchies.

 

Can Anarchists Accept Nonconsensual Hierarchies?

To sum up the findings so far, I have identified the following nonconsensual hierarchies that are, or can be, created and perpetuated by anybody’s reproduction:

1. The power position of parents over the nonconsenting individuals they bring into existence by a unilateral decision, without the consent of the future beings.[19] [20]
2. The parental and parental-type authority positions over children, adolescents, and beyond.[21]
3. The cultural pressure to bring children up as reproducers.[22]

For liberation natalists, also this loose reproductive dilemma is something to be considered:

4. They can either:

bring up future reproducers in which case they perpetuate hierarchies 1-3

or

bring up anarchist antinatalists in which case they nonconsensually perpetuate their own anarchist attitudes.

According to my argument in the beginning, anarchists should be antinatalists insofar as

i) anarchism means being against nonconsensual hierarchies

and

ii) reproduction creates and perpetuates nonconsensual hierarchies.

I have now shown that (ii) is true in senses 1-4. But is that enough? Or can liberation natalists find excuses or justifications for some nonconsensual hierarchies? What does it mean (i) to be against them, anyway?

I can think of the following counterarguments, point by point:

1. There is no other way to have new people.
2. Parental authority is only temporary and it is necessary.
3. Parents can let children make up their own minds on reproduction.
4. Liberation natalists are no less anarchists if their education style produces new anarchists.

A few comments on these are in order to defend my own thesis.

 

Jesuit Morality Against Anarchist Prefiguration

The ‘there-is-no-alternative’ (1) and ‘it-is-only-temporary’ (2) points are, as far as I can see, a direct attack against anarchist ethics. Benjamin Franks, a philosophical expert on the topic, writes in the beginning of his 2003 article “Direct Action Ethics”:

A particular ethic […] within anarchist direct action […] has two features: The first requires that the means be in accordance with the ends (prefiguration); the second concerns the identity of the subjects involved in the act. Prefiguration distinguishes direct action from both Leninist consequentialism and the deontological approaches of liberal and anarcho-capitalist traditions. The identities of the agents involved and created through direct action illustrate important differences between anarchist direct action and that of right wing groupings such as the Rural Rebels.[23]

Applied to the case of reproduction, the two principles Franks identifies pinpoint the weaknesses of the liberation natalist position.

James Guillaume, an early anarchist and associate of Mikhail Bakunin, expressed the idea of prefiguration as follows:

How could one want an equalitarian and free society to issue from authoritarian organisation? It is impossible.[24]

Guillaume’s words were directed against all those who thought that in revolutionary activities the ends justify the means. Many socialists of the time accepted this moral logic and thought that a dictatorship of the proletariat was the way, and the right way, to achieve the eventual classless and stateless communist society. Bakunin and Guillaume, as the latter’s words testify, disagreed.

Insofar as liberation natalists go, they resemble the socialists and communists shunned by these early anarchists. Since in the end there must be people and since authoritarian elements are unavoidable in raising-up new citizens, nonconsensual hierarchies must be temporarily tolerated, they say. But, following the principle of prefiguration, this is wrong. An anarchist cannot, at least if Guillaume was right, accept such Jesuit morality,[25] or, in Franks’ nomenclature, Leninist consequentialism.

 

Liberal Conformism Against Anarchist Prefiguration

The ‘parents-can-let-their-children-choose’ (3) and ‘there-is-nothing-wrong-in-producing-new-anarchists’ (4) points are also attacks on prefiguration, albeit more indirectly. Nonconservative parents can justify their education methods and goals in terms of a ready-made social model that they uphold, liberal democracy. In their ideal society, freedom is respected and rights protected for the greater good of the community. Utilitarian and neo-republican definitions are available for the greater good referred to.

The classical utilitarian way is to pursue the greatest good (happiness or wellbeing) of the greatest number and to allow restrictions of liberty and the use of coercion if they are conducive to achieving that goal. This is akin to Franks’ Leninist consequentialism. The liberal utilitarian alternative is to allow coercion only if it is intended to prevent harmful actions against others. The aggregative element remains, however, and lesser harm to some can be condoned if it helps to reduce greater harm to many others.[26]

Neo-republican philosophers concentrate on the definition of freedom or liberty. Utilitarians see potentially wrongful coercion in every instance where someone’s actions are restricted. Neo-republicans allow apparent restrictions of individual freedom when they are indirectly consensual, willed by those restricted themselves through democratic processes. The liberty that ought to be politically protected is nondomination in this sense. Civic liberty is not jeopardized by laws that prevent citizens from doing what they should not reasonably want to do anyway.[27]

Liberation natalists could use these justifications for their unilateral decision-making. They are protecting their children from greater harm by restricting their action. Or they are not even restricting anything, as the children will, as they grow up, understand the rules. If they have become reproducers themselves, they are grateful to their parents for imprinting this good code on them. And if they end up being voluntarily childless, they are grateful to their parents for giving them the freedom to choose.

There is no need to insist that the childless alternative would be in any way faulty. The parents’ worldview has been successfully passed on, which smacks of nonconsensual influence, but if the children stay childless, the way is open to antinatalism, as suggested by my thesis.

As for the grateful followers of the family’s childbearing tradition, however, prefiguration’s absence removes all anarchism from the equation. The parents have, for the happiness or nondomination of the society as a whole, imposed into their children’s minds nonconsensual hierarchies that the children are likely to perpetuate. This is liberal democracy, and liberal democracy does not amount to anarchy.

 

Liberation-Natalist vs. Anarchist Identity

These considerations leave one avenue to be explored. Liberation natalists could point out that, as reproducers, they are discriminated against in the Bakunin-Guillaume-Franks anarchist movement, especially if it has taken the antinatalist turn that I am envisioning for it. This makes them an oppressed group that all true anarchists should wholeheartedly support. Langer seems to make more or less this claim by stating:

In many ways, what anarcho-natalism is resistant towards is authoritarianpaternalistmorality of anti-natalists who would claim to know what is best for not-yet-born individuals. In this sense, the liberation natalist rebellion is equally one of child/youth liberation against the oppressive/repressive uber-Parent (who knows best). Like a bullying grandparent, who belittles their child’s efforts in parenting, anti-natalists assume a position of knowing what is best for the child, before the child is even born or conceived, so attempt to take control of their fate.[28]

Let me take a closer look to see whether this dents my case.

Do antinatalists “claim to know what is best for not-yet-born individuals”? Some of them do. Benatar, for instance, insists that “even the best lives are very bad” and that it would be optimal for everyone never to exist or never to have existed.[29] Some of them do not. MacCormack makes no claims about the value of people’s lives to themselves, as her reason for advocating antinatalism is the good of other species and the natural environment.[30] Those who rely on the risk argument for antinatalism only say that the lives created can be bad, even miserable.[31]

Apart from Benatar, then, there is no sign of the “oppressive/repressive uber-Parent” Langer fears, and his objection evaporates. The fear is not totally ungrounded, of course, Benatar being the model antinatalist, but it is not entirely valid, either. There are antinatalists who do not fall into this trap.

More generally, though, are liberation natalists and their liberation-natalist children an oppressed group? Not if we rely on Franks’ analysis of anarchist ethics. His second principle states that a group must fulfil certain criteria to be oppressed in the relevant sense. Some direct-action groups, for him, do not meet the criteria:

The Rural Rebels and the Petrol Boycott campaigners […] do consider themselves to be members of oppressed groups. In the first they are rural people attacked by an urban elite, in the latter businesspeople subject to retrogressive taxation that was harming their enterprises. However, their “oppressed” identities are certainly distinct from those considered legitimate by anarchists. In both cases the activists are predominantly landowners and businesspeople who wish to reinforce the hierarchies of capital relations to maintain their position, not subvert or undermine them.[32]

It would be unfair to liken liberation natalists to the groups Franks mentions one-to-one – anarchist reproducers do not deliberately champion the capitalist cause. But it would, I believe, also be inaccurate not to see some fertile points of comparison. All these, liberation natalism included, defend a prevailing status quo against change. The Rural Rebels and the Petrol Boycott campaigners protect capitalism, liberation natalists endeavor to perpetuate human procreation.

 

Prefigurative Radical Anarchists Should Be Antinatalists

I posed a question in the title: “Should anarchists be antinatalists?” Answers to questions like this are bound to depend on what we mean by the terms and expressions used – in this case, “anarchism”, “antinatalism”, and “should be”.

I have assumed that anarchists should be against the creation and perpetuation of nonconsensual hierarchies, adhere to the principle of prefiguration, and oppose hegemonic ways.

I have tried to demonstrate that having children and bringing them up creates and perpetuates nonconsensual hierarchies; and suggested that extant attempts to justify them contradict the principle of prefiguration and the requirement to oppose hegemonies.

By antinatalism I have, all along, meant being against reproduction, all reproduction, on ethical grounds.

From these, I deduce that prefigurative radical anarchists should be – have good reason to be – antinatalists and rest my case.

 

The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast is available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@exploringantinatalismpodcast 

 

References

[1] The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast. Antinatalism Definition Panel. 18 August 2024. https://youtu.be/99B4ZzgkftQ?si=tB4V24H3klXXFhD3

[2] Knight, Les U. Why real anarchists don’t breed. These Exit Times 2002a. https://www.vhemt.org/anobreed.htm

[3] Häyry, Matti. Is transferred parental responsibility legitimately enforceable? In Frida Simonstein, ed. Reprogen-Ethics and the Future of Gender. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009: 135–49, 135–6.

[4] Häyry 2009, 136.

[5] MacCormack, Patricia. The Ahuman Manifesto: Activism for the End of the Anthropocene. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020, 144.

[6] Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006, 194.

[7]  Knight, Les U. VHEMT denied participation in anarchist book fair. These Exit Times 2002b. https://www.vhemt.org/anobreed.htm.

[8] Extinction Rebellion is a movement that embodies these ideals. Interestingly, however, its anarchism may be in question. While its activities have been labelled as anarchist by outsiders (Power and protest. How the anarchists of Extinction Rebellion got so well organised. The climate-change rebels have been reading up on management theory, The Economist 10 October 2019 – https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/10/10/how-the-anarchists-of-extinction-rebellion-got-so-well-organised) the claim has also been rejected from the inside as a wrongful accusation (Rivett, Bob. Extinction Rebellion protesters aren’t anarchists – we just want to save our world. The Guardian 19 July 2019 – https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/19/extinction-rebellion-protesters-ordinary-people).

[9] Knight 2002a.

[10] Langer, Julian. Liberation natalism: On anti-natalism. The Anarchist Library 21 April 2021. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/julian-langer-liberation-natalism.

[11] Feinberg, Joel. Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

[12] Davis, Dena S. Genetic dilemmas and the child’s right to an open future. Hastings Center Report 27 (1997): 7–15.

[13] Takala, Tuija. The child’s right to an open future and modern genetics. In Brenda Almond and Michael Parker,  eds. Ethical Issues in the New Genetics: Are Genes Us? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003: 39–46.

[14] Häyry, Matti and Sukenick, Amanda. Imposing a lifestyle: A new argument for antinatalism. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 33 (2024a): 238–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180123000385

[15] Häyry, Matti and Sukenick, Amanda. Antinatalism, Extinction, and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024b. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009455299

[16] Cabrera, Julio. Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019.

[17] Benatar, David. Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 345–55.

[18] Häyry, Heta. The Limits of Medical Paternalism. London: Routledge, 1991.

[19] Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and the significance of harm. Legal Theory 5 (1999): 117–48.

[20] Singh, Asheel. Furthering the case for anti-natalism: Seana Shiffrin and the limits of permissible harm. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2012): 104–16.

[21] Knight 2002a.

[22] Häyry and Sukenick 2024a; 2024b.

[23] Franks, Benjamin. Direct action ethic. Anarchist Studies 11 (2003): 13-41, 16.

[24] Cited by Franks, Benjamin. Direct action ethic. Anarchist Studies 11 (2003): 13-41, 22.

[25] The expression “Jesuit morality” is used here in its colloquial sense and should not be taken as a statement against any system of morality.

[26] Driver, Julia. The history of utilitarianism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/utilitarianism-history/

[27] Lovett, Frank. Republicanism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/republicanism/

[28] Langer 2021, 6.

[29] Benatar 2006, 61.

[30] MacCormack 2020.

[31] Häyry and Sukenick 2024.

[32] Franks 2003, 29.